By exploiting a unique health insurance benefit design, we provide novel evidence on the causal association between outpatient and inpatient care. Our results indicate that greater outpatient spending was associated with more hospital admissions: a $100 increase in outpatient spending was associated with a 2.7% increase in the probability of having an inpatient event and a 4.6% increase in inpatient spending among enrollees in our sample. Moreover, we present evidence that the increase in hospital admissions associated with greater outpatient spending was for conditions in which it is plausible to argue that the physician and patient could exercise discretion. 2 We also exploit variation in outpatient care due to changes in prescription drug copayments and outpatient deductible.
Introduction
There are plausible scenarios in which a trip to the doctor's office leads to the detection and successful treatment of a condition that, if left untreated, would result in illness and hospitalization. For example, hyperlipidemia, if untreated, is significantly associated with coronary artery disease, but appropriate diagnosis and treatment with statins substantially reduces future illness and hospitalization. However, there are equally plausible scenarios in which a visit to the doctor leads to a referral to a specialist for additional evaluation and potential invasive treatment for a condition that, if left untreated, would resolve itself in time (or is best left untreated). For example, a PSA (prostate-specific antigen) exam for prostate cancer that is abnormally high may lead to a referral to a urologist, a biopsy and surgery.
These two treatments for common illnesses are illustrative examples of primary care, one effective and cost reducing and the other ineffective and cost increasing, that are central to the current health care reform debate. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) includes several provisions that bolster the supply of primary care physicians and subsidize receipt of primary care. Underlying this policy is the belief that primary care is preventive and cost reducing (see, for example, Starfield et al. 2005; Rittenhouse and Shortell 2009 ). In addition, the expansion of health insurance coverage, which is also a prominent part of the ACA, is often justified with references to the cost-effectiveness of primary care, which is known to increase among newly insured persons. On the other hand, almost everyone agrees that there is significant waste in the US health care system. Important evidence supporting the waste argument comes from the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care (e.g., Wennberg et al. 2005; Fisher et al. 2009 ). The Dartmouth view is that much spending on medical care is due to "supplysensitive" care, which is care that is intensive (e.g., many visits to specialist), expensive (e.g., invasive procedures), and driven by provider preferences (e.g., no clearly defined evidence-based guidelines). Much of this "supply sensitive" care has little proven health benefits. If the Dartmouth view is correct, then greater insurance coverage and greater use of primary care will result in more hospitalizations because visits to the doctor often result in aggressive treatment that involves hospitalization and arguably little health benefit (Fisher et al. 2003) .
Empirical evidence on the association between primary (outpatient) care and inpatient care is sparse, particularly evidence that may be interpreted as causal, despite the importance of this relationship to health economics and health policy. Research that comes closest to providing such evidence are studies that examine the association between health insurance status and hospitalizations because of the known increase in primary care that comes with insurance coverage. However, health insurance changes the price of both inpatient and outpatient care and studies of the association between health insurance and hospitalization do not directly provide evidence on the association between primary care and hospitalization.
Three recent studies provide mixed evidence as to the relationship between health insurance coverage and hospitalization using quasi-experimental methods. Using a regression discontinuity design, Anderson et al. (2012) found that young adults who lost family health insurance coverage had significantly lower rates of emergency department use and hospital admissions than those who did not lose family health insurance coverage. Kolstad and Kowalski (2010) examined the Massachusetts health care reform and found that gaining insurance was associated with a decrease in hospital admissions through emergency department, an increase in hospital admissions through other channels, and no change in total hospitalizations. Miller (2011) , who also studied the Massachusetts reform, found that reform was associated with a decrease in outpatient emergency room visits, particularly those that are preventable with primary care.
Experimental findings from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) showed that health insurance coverage (i.e., more generous coverage) was associated with an increase in use of emergency room services and hospitalization (Newhouse 1993) . Specifically, emergency department use was 30% to 35% lower for those with the least generous insurance (95% coinsurance) than for those with the insurance plan that paid all costs (i.e., free plan), and any use of inpatient services was 25% lower for those with the least generous insurance (95% coinsurance) than for those with the insurance plan that paid all costs; the findings led the researchers to conclude that inpatient and outpatient services were complements. Similarly, evidence from the Oregon Medicaid experiment also shows that obtaining health insurance, in this case, Medicaid, is positively associated with hospitalization (Finkelstein et al. 2011) .
Another line of research related to the question of whether outpatient and inpatient care are substitutes or complements are studies examining the association between changes in prescription drug use (or prices), which is a distinct type of outpatient care, and use of inpatient services. There have been several studies and the evidence from these studies is mixed. 1 For example, Chandra et al. (2010) reported that increases in copayments for prescription drugs among employees in the California Public Employees Retirement System were associated with a decrease in the use of prescription drugs and an increase in the probability of hospitalization.
However, Kaestner and Khan (2012) found that gaining prescription drug insurance through Medicare Part D was associated with a 28% increase in prescription drug use, a 45% increase in spending on prescription drugs, and no change in inpatient spending among a sample of 1 Studies in this area include: Soumerai et al. (1991) ; Johnson et al. (1997); Breischer et al. (2005) ; Hsu et al. (2006) ; Chandra et al. (2010) ; Afendulis et al. (2011); McWilliams et al. (2011); and Kaestner and Khan (2012) .
Medicare recipients drawn from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey. Results from other studies offer similarly mixed evidence. More importantly, the evidence from these studies is limited by the focus on prescription drugs, which is an important, but small part of outpatient care.
In sum, there is virtually no recent evidence, particularly evidence that can be interpreted as causal, as to whether outpatient and inpatient care are substitutes or complements. This is an important gap in knowledge because of the importance of this question to understanding how the health care market operates. Evidence as to whether outpatient and inpatient care are substitutes or complements is central to both health economics and health policy.
In this paper, we obtain estimates of the relationship between outpatient and inpatient care. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to assess directly whether outpatient and inpatient care are substitutes or complements. Importantly, the research design underlying our empirical analysis supports the case for interpreting our estimates as causal. Our research takes advantage of changes in insurance plan features that affect only outpatient care with the most important feature being a unique benefit design in which funds contained in a savings account (technically a health reimbursement arrangement or HRA) can be used only to pay for outpatient and pharmacy services, and not inpatient care and outpatient surgery services. 2 The inability to use HRA dollars for inpatient care, in contrast to the better known Health Savings Account (HSA) products, is the key to our research design because it provides an exogenous change in the price of outpatient care without affecting the price of inpatient care. Capitalizing on the exogenous change in insurance plan design specific to outpatient services contrasts to other studies that, for example, focus on the association between health insurance or changes in health insurance benefits and inpatient care, because the changes typically alter the price of both outpatient and inpatient care. The design was a feature marketed by the insurer intended to prevent a costly hospitalization from depleting the account balance. The insurance product was designed and sold by a health insurer offering exclusively high-deductible health plans on a full replacement basis in the small group market.
Results of our analysis indicate that a $100 (4%) increase in outpatient spending resulted in an $89 (4.6%) increase in inpatient spending among employees in the employer-sponsored insurance plans in our sample. Moreover, the increase in hospital admissions associated with greater outpatient spending was concentrated among conditions in which there is significant geographical variation in admission rates and for which physicians exercise considerable discretion-care consistent with "supply sensitive" treatment that has been shown to be without clinical evidence of its effectiveness. In contrast, there was no relationship between outpatient spending and admissions for low-discretion (variation) procedures such as major cardiovascular care or for births.
Setting and Data
Data for the empirical analysis are drawn from the universe of claims for a small Midwestern health insurance company that was an early entrant in the "consumer-driven" health plan market. The data include claims and enrollment information for employees and their dependents within firms offering a high-deductible health plan sponsored by the health insurance company from 2000 through mid-2006. We have information on all paid claims for inpatient, outpatient, and pharmaceutical services throughout the policy year. We use only observations that included full policy years. In addition, we have information on health plan characteristics including HRA "deposits" at the beginning of each policy year, roll-over account balances from the prior year, deductible amount, coinsurance rates for both in-and out-of-network care (the claims data contain an indicator for network status of the provider), out-of-pocket maximum levels, and copayments for pharmaceuticals. Employers are able to change plan characteristics annually.
The HRA plan design used notional (non-transferable) accounts for first-dollar coverage of pre-specified health care purchases. Employers and employees could fund their accounts on a tax-free basis and unspent dollars roll over into subsequent years. As noted earlier, a key feature of the insurance plan design was that HRA dollars could not be used to pay for expenditures associated with inpatient care or outpatient surgery; a separate hospital and surgery deductible is specified in the benefit design to impose cost-sharing on that type of utilization. Note that this plan feature is distinct from HSA designs, which allow account dollars to be used for inpatient and outpatient health care expenditures. 3 Another advantageous feature of the HRA plans in our study is that the insurer sold the insurance policies exclusively on a total replacement basis; employers do not offer competing plans from this or other insurers and almost all firms offer just one insurance plan to employees. 4 Therefore, employees do not choose among insurance plans and we do not have to address the selection issue that comes from employee plan choice. We limit our sample to firms that had five or more enrollees because of the possibility that changes in health and use of services for specific enrollees will determine insurance plan features. In larger firms, insurance plan features are plausibly exogenous with respect to individual enrollee 3 The insurer began offering HSAs after they were created in the 2004 Medicare Modernization Act, but given the timing of our data very few firms offered them to employees. A small number of enrollees (<1%) were dropped because they were enrolled in HSAs. 4 A small number, 3%, of employers offered more than one plan design to employees in the study period. Most commonly, employees could select a higher or lower deductible option. However, results reported below did not change appreciably when these few employers were excluded from the sample. It is very common among small firms that offer health insurance to only offer one plan: the 2012 Kaiser/HRET Employer Health Benefit Survey reveals that 83% of small firms (3-199) who offer health insurance offer only one plan (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012). behavior. Results (available from authors) are virtually unchanged from those we report below if we limit the sample to firms with 10 employees, suggesting that results are not being driven by employer-responses to employee health care spending. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for individual enrollees by policy year. Our data include 2,380 company-years representing 959 unique firms. Note that the period represents the start-up period for the insurer's operation, which began operation in 2000, and thus there are few employers in the early years. We limit the analysis to firms with information for full policy years. Therefore, because our data only include completed policy years ending by 7/31/06 the number of firms (observations) in the sample is reduced substantially in 2005. The average firm size is approximately 25 employees. The average age of the employee is about 40 years. 5 In just over half of cases the employee is a single enrollee. Not surprisingly, and consistent with national trends, spending in all categories increased over time. Outpatient spending increased from $2350 in 2001 to $2872 in 2005 and average pharmaceutical spending more than doubled over the period. The fraction of enrollees using inpatient services stayed relatively constant at 15% over the period, though average spending on inpatient care increased.
Research Design and Econometric Methods
Our objective is to obtain estimates of the association between outpatient care (spending) and inpatient care (spending). This empirical objective is motivated by two hypotheses grounded in theory as to the causes of an association between outpatient care (spending) and inpatient care (spending). The first hypothesis is that outpatient care consists of treatments that repair health subsequent to illness and/or prevent illness. This hypothesis is consistent with the human capital model of the demand for health and health care (Grossman 1972) . In this case, outpatient care is health improving and, all else equal, will decrease inpatient care, which is an indicator of serious illness. The all else equal assumption is particularly important because the association between the quantity of outpatient and inpatient care is almost surely positive if health shocks are not well measured because such shocks will cause an increase in both outcomes. The second hypothesis is that outpatient care consists of treatments that have little value in terms of repairing health or preventing illness. This hypothesis is consistent with theories of physician agency and supplier induced demand (e.g., McGuire 2000) , and the geographical variation in treatments documented by the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care (Fisher et al. 2003) . In this case, more outpatient care results in greater inpatient care, as physicians exercise discretion and treat marginal illnesses "aggressively" using intensive, inpatient care. The two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and it is likely that outpatient care has characteristics consistent with both hypotheses. Here, we estimate the average association between outpatient and inpatient care.
Ideally, our estimates are interpretable as causal estimates. To obtain such estimates, we estimate the following regression model:
( )
In equation (1), inpatient utilization (i.e., any use) of employee/family i in firm j in year t depends on a firm-specific fixed effect, ; year fixed effects, ; coinsurance for in-network care (COIN); coinsurance for out-of-network care (COOUT); the hospital-specific deductible (HOSPDEDUCT), which represents an out-of-pocket payment requirement associated with each inpatient or outpatient surgery event; the out-of-pocket maximum (OOPMAX), which is the maximum amount that can be paid out-of-pocket by the enrollee during the policy year; and personal characteristics (X) of the employee/family (e.g., age, gender, number of dependents,
year of tenure in the plan). Note that all insurance plan features vary only by firm, year and type of insurance unit (family vs. individual). Our interest is in the effect of outpatient spending (OUTSPEND) on inpatient use. Also note that equation (1) only contains insurance plan features that are related to inpatient spending, and plan characteristics specific to outpatient spending such as the outpatient deductible and the employee HRA are omitted.
The main challenge in estimating equation (1) is that outpatient spending may be influenced by unmeasured characteristics that also affect inpatient spending, most notably health status. To address the potential endogeneity concern we use an instrumental variables approach.
The instruments for outpatient spending are the employer's contribution to the spending account (HRA), the outpatient deductible, and pharmacy copayment levels. These benefit design features are determined prior to the start of the year and affect only the cost of outpatient use. For example, a change in the amount of employer's contribution to the HRA, which by design is only relevant to outpatient spending, will affect outpatient use, but not inpatient use beyond how outpatient use affects inpatient use. 6
The identifying assumption of the instrumental variables approach is that employers make decisions regarding HRA contributions and other benefit design features independently of employee health and preferences for health care. Plausible explanations for employer changes in benefit design include the rising costs of health care, changes in firm profitability or the firm's competitive position that affect decisions about compensation (including health care benefits), and potential adjustments to a new benefit plan for which the firm had no prior experience. It is important to note that equation (1) includes firm-specific fixed effects that control for time invariant employer-specific factors that might be associated with both health care spending and health plan characteristics. Below, we present evidence that supports the identification assumption underlying the instrumental variables approach.
In Table 2 , we present data on benefit plan characteristics that are the source of variation used to instrument for outpatient spending. The figures in Table 2 have been adjusted for the changing composition of firms in order to provide a description of how plan features have changed over time within firm, which is the key source of variation that we use to obtain estimates of the association between inpatient and outpatient spending. The values in Table 2 indicate that employers tend to decrease plan generosity systematically over time: employer account contributions fall over time within firm by approximately $100 per year and the outpatient deductible increases by approximately $50 per year. 7 The observed changes represent compelling and substantial sources of within-firm variation in outpatient benefit generosity that are expected to affect outpatient spending decisions by enrollees. Importantly, the changes pertain only to outpatient spending and therefore provide a source of plausibly exogenous variation to identify the association between inpatient and outpatient spending.
The specification of the first stage model used to predict outpatient spending is:
( ) . 7 We do not directly observe the employer contributions to the HRA in our data because the insurer only recorded the total contribution to the account balance at the beginning of the year. Nevertheless, we are able to proxy for the employer's contribution by determining the minimum observed account balance measured at the beginning of the policy year among employees in firm j and year t. The minimum account balance is specific to employees in each coverage option: single, employee plus one dependent, employee plus two or more dependents. Hence to the extent that at least one employee in each coverage option-firm-year cell chooses not to contribute to their account (the calculation excludes rollover dollars), our approach will identify the true contribution of the firm to the account. If all employees contribute some amount to the HRA, the minimum observed amount is a reasonable proxy to the generosity of the employer contribution. See Lo Sasso et al. (2010) for additional details.
In equation (2), outpatient spending depends on the following excluded instruments that by design can only affect outpatient spending: employer contribution to the account (EMPCONTRIB), the outpatient deductible (OUTDEDUCT), and the pharmacy copayment level (COPAY). In addition, the other plan features that may affect inpatient care and personal characteristics described in equation (1) are included in the model. (1) and (2) represent local average treatment effects (LATE). As illustrated in Table 2 To this point we have ignored dynamic aspects of the problem. However, outpatient care this year may affect inpatient care in the subsequent year. That is, being treated on an outpatient basis for a condition last year may avoid a hospitalization this year. Alternatively, if spending involves largely "supply sensitive" care then previous outpatient spending has little effect on current health (perhaps even a negative effect) and will have little influence on current inpatient care. In fact, outpatient spending last year that is largely "supply sensitive" may increase inpatient spending this year because of the persistence of such physician-induced care. Still further, if some outpatient care is necessary as a follow-up to inpatient care we might be concerned about the timing of events in the contemporaneous model above. In this manner, lagged outpatient care must clearly precede current inpatient care. In order to assess the influence of lagged outpatient spending on current inpatient care, we reformulate our model as:
Instrumental variables estimates obtained from equations
where inpatient use in time t is function of lagged outpatient use. We are able to instrument for lagged outpatient spending with same (lagged) instrument set described earlier.
The specification of equation (3) yields estimates of the total effect of lagged outpatient spending on inpatient care that includes the direct association and the indirect associations that operate through current outpatient spending and lagged inpatient spending. If outpatient spending is truly preventive, and the relationship is dynamic, we expect the estimate of the association between lagged outpatient spending and inpatient care to be negative. One necessary compromise in the lagged specification is that it requires three, not two, years of consecutive enrollment by firms, thus reducing our sample size considerably. 8 We also estimate an alternative specification in which we include current outpatient spending in the model:
( )
The only difference between equations (3) and (4) is the inclusion of contemporaneous outpatient spending. Including current outpatient spending eliminates the indirect association between lagged outpatient spending and inpatient care that operates through current outpatient spending. In order to understand what components of outpatient care change when the employer contribution changes, we estimated similar first-stage regression models for three major components of outpatient spending plus a residual category, which we refer to as "other". The first category includes spending on outpatient specialty services (services provided by otorhinolaryngology, pulmonologist, allergist, neurologist, dermatology, and rehabilitation, among others). The second category includes spending on office visits defined as office-based evaluation and management for new or established patients ranging from 10 minutes to 1 hour.
Results

4.a. First Stage-Associations between Plan Characteristics and Outpatient Spending
The third category includes spending on prescription drugs. All other outpatient spending is aggregated into the "other" category. Estimates indicate that a $100 increase in employer contribution to the HRA is associated with a $11 increase in spending on outpatient specialty services; an $8 increase in spending associated with office visits; a $6 increase in spending on prescription drugs; and a $7 increase in "other" outpatient spending. The results in Table 3 suggest that a more generous employer contribution to the account leads patients to visit the doctor's office more frequently (25% of the total effect), which in turn leads to referrals to outpatient specialty care (one-third of the total effect) and some change in pharmaceutical use (20% of the total effect). In the next section we consider whether the observed increases in outpatient care are associated with changes in inpatient utilization. This is a clinically and economically significant effect of the observed change in the employer contribution to the HRA account. Also note that the addition of age-by-gender interaction terms to the model has virtually no effect, which suggest that changes in employee composition are not affecting estimates. In fact, Appendix Table 3 displays estimates from a model that includes individual fixed effects. Estimates are very similar to the results shown in Table 4 , but the precision of estimates is substantially reduced because of a smaller sample.
4.b. Relationship between Inpatient and Outpatient Spending
The right hand panel of Table 4 presents As we have noted, IV estimates tend to be larger (in absolute value) than OLS estimates.
While this circumstance may appear to be surprising given that a likely source of bias of OLS estimates is unmeasured health that would tend to make OLS estimates larger (more positive) than IV estimates, it is important to recognize the LATE nature of the IV estimate. Only in the case of no treatment heterogeneity is it reasonable to compare IV and OLS estimates for the purpose of discussion of possible causes of bias. Absent this special case, IV (LATE) and OLS procedures are estimating different parameters, and there is no expectation that one should be larger or smaller than the other. In this case, changes in outpatient spending that we use are most likely affecting relatively healthy people (as compared to chronically ill) with some ailments and they are likely to differ from the average patient. Table 5 presents estimates from the simple, dynamic model described earlier. Here, we allow for a lagged effect of outpatient spending. The use of lagged spending addresses concerns about the temporal order of outpatient and inpatient spending as well as concerns that effects of outpatient spending on inpatient care are delayed. We focus our discussion on the instrumental variables estimates. The estimate of the association between lagged outpatient spending and any inpatient care is 0.0026 and statistically significant. The IV estimate of the association between lagged outpatient spending and inpatient spending is positive, small and not statistically significant. Combined, estimates suggest that lagged outpatient care increases the proportion of sample with some inpatient care, but reduces inpatient spending amount for some portion of those with inpatient spending. However, all estimates are positive, which is inconsistent with the argument that outpatient care is largely preventive and more consistent with the argument that outpatient care is largely of the "supply sensitive" type.
Estimates presented in the third and fourth columns of Table 5 are obtained from a model that includes both lagged and current outpatient spending. IV estimates of associations between lagged outpatient spending and inpatient spending are small and not statistically significant.
Standard errors are noticeably larger in the models that include both lagged and contemporaneous outpatient spending. Overall, estimates in Table 5 suggest that lagged outpatient spending has little direct effect on current inpatient care, which is evidence inconsistent with the argument that the association between outpatient spending and inpatient care is largely preventive. In contrast, IV estimates of effects of current outpatient spending on inpatient care in Table 5 remain positive, statistically significant and roughly the same magnitude as estimates obtained from models that omit lagged outpatient spending. Thus, again, we find evidence consistent with the argument that, on average, outpatient care increases the quantity of and spending on downstream care (i.e., inpatient care).
In order to assess what types of inpatient conditions are affected by changes in outpatient care, we examined the effects of outpatient spending on inpatient admissions grouped by the amount of geographical variation in admission rates. Geographical variation in inpatient admissions is often used as a marker for physician discretion-decisions for which there is uncertainty over whether an admission is necessary and/or clinically beneficial (Sirovitch et al.
2008). Changes in outpatient care should plausibly have larger effects on high-variation hospital
admissions for which there is a great deal of physician discretion than for low-variation hospital admissions for which there is little physician discretion. For example, we might expect to observe some enrollees induced into back and neck surgical procedures and other care that is subject to greater physician discretion when people are exogenously exposed to greater amounts of outpatient care.
We grouped hospital admissions into categories using diagnosis related group (DRG) codes and the classification system employed by Silber et al. (2010) that was developed to distinguish between inpatient events with low variation across providers (example: major cardiovascular procedures), middle variation across providers (example: laparoscopic cholecystectomy), and high variation across providers (example: spinal fusion surgery). The full list of procedures and DRG codes is available in Appendix Table 4 . et al. 1995; Pappas et al. 1997; Shi et al. 1999; Kaestner et al. 2001; Dafny and Gruber 2005) . If outpatient spending is largely prevention, then the association between outpatient spending and ACS admissions is expected to be negative. However, the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care has examined ambulatory care sensitive conditions and documented that admission rates for these conditions are highly variable across geography, at least in the Medicare population. The high degree of geographic variation implies that the ambulatory care sensitive conditions identified by AHRQ and others may be more discretionary than the developers of these measures believe.
Specifically, the Dartmouth authors write: "When science-based guidelines are weak, physicians must be guided by their subjective opinions about the effectiveness of admitting such patients to hospitals, rather than providing treatment in another setting. Hospitalization rates for theseand for most medical conditionsare also highly correlated with the local supply of hospital beds"
(Dartmouth Atlas 2012).
The fourth column of Table 6 presents the instrumental variables estimate of the association between outpatient spending and admission for an ambulatory-care sensitive condition. Consistent with Dartmouth Atlas view, we find that increases in outpatient spending results in a statistically significant increase in hospitalizations for ambulatory care sensitive conditions. The effect size, 0.07 percentage points, is close to the estimate associated with highvariation admissions.
Finally, we examined whether outpatient spending was associated with births. Births represent a falsification test related to the measurement of key variables in our specification.
While there is little reason to expect increases in the employer contribution to the HRA to have a causal effect on births, if savings account contributions were improperly measured or if employer contributions were altered based on potential health care need an effect might manifest when examining births. Thus it is reassuring that the effect of outpatient spending on births is very close to zero and statistically insignificant.
Conclusion
An important issue in assessing recent health care reform is the likely costs and benefits of expanded access to primary care. Proponents of expanded use of primary care often argue that in addition to improving health, expanded primary care use may reduce the costs of health care because increased contact with primary care providers will allow for greater detection of previously unknown and untreated conditions, hence leading to reduced hospitalizations. In this article, we take advantage of a unique health insurance benefit design to assess the causal relationship between outpatient services and hospitalization.
Using proprietary data from an insurer, we employ an instrumental variables strategy to investigate whether variation in the use of outpatient services were associated with changes in hospitalizations. To our knowledge, ours if the first paper to provide such estimates, at least estimates that are plausibly interpretable as causal. Estimates indicated that greater outpatient spending was associated with more hospital admissions and greater inpatient spending. For example, a $100 (4%) increase in outpatient spending was associated with a 2.7% increase in the probability of having an inpatient event and a 4.6% increase in inpatient spending among employees in the employer-sponsored insurance plans in our sample. Moreover, we presented evidence that the increase in hospital admissions associated with greater outpatient spending was for conditions in which it is plausible to argue that the physician could exercise more discretion-treat "aggressively". In contrast, there was no association between outpatient spending and admissions for births or low-variation procedures such as major cardiovascular care.
The nearly dollar for dollar positive association between changes in outpatient spending and changes in inpatient spending has significant implications for both theory and policy. In terms of theory, our results suggest that outpatient spending and inpatient spending are complements, at least at the margin for which our LATE estimates apply. More importantly, the positive association between outpatient and inpatient spending that we find is not, as is often the case, because unmeasured health confounds the association. Tests of the validity of the instrumental variables research design we employed support its validity, which implies that changes in outpatient spending that result from changes in insurance plan benefit designs are plausibly exogenous. Thus, the positive association between outpatient spending and inpatient spending we find is consistent with the Dartmouth view that much health care spending, in this case outpatient spending, is "supply sensitive" and largely without substantial health benefit.
This result persisted even when we estimated a dynamic model that allowed lagged outpatient spending to influence current inpatient care.
It is interesting to note that the context of our results was a high-deductible, "consumer driven" insurance plan with a focus on demand side cost sharing. Our results suggest that consumers appear to respond significantly to changes in cost sharing, and that even though the initial change in consumer health care use in response to changes in cost sharing is for relatively low cost, outpatient care, there is also a decrease in subsequent use of more expensive inpatient care. For example, the $500 average decrease in the employer contribution to the HRA that occurred between 2000 and 2005 was associated with a $160 decrease in outpatient spending and a $144 decrease in inpatient spending. Thus, total spending decreased by $304, or approximately 5%. Our results suggest that high deductible insurance plans targeted at reducing outpatient use of services may be effective at reducing the discretionary use of inpatient services that other researchers have suggested have marginal health benefit. The consumer-directed approach is a contrast to administrative and supply-side approaches to reduce the same supposed unnecessary use of services such as the establishment of the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force that identifies cost-effective prevention services that merit no cost sharing; the establishment of the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute; and payment reforms linking payments to clinical outcomes and how the delivery of care is organized (e.g., accountable care organizations).
Overall, the findings from our study are consistent with the argument made in Sirovich et al. (2008) and others associated with the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care. In this view, using more primary care services leads to more hospitalizations as a result of physicians' discretionary decisions regarding aggressive and intensive treatment. Cleary not all physicians need to practice medicine in an "aggressive" treatment style for such findings to obtain; when individuals are exogenously induced to use more outpatient care through a more generous insurance plan design, enrollees merely need to have a positive probability of seeing a physician with an aggressive treatment style. In addition, health insurance has a direct effect on hospitalization because it lowers the price of inpatient care. The implication of these findings is that expanding health insurance, as recent federal reform (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act) proposes, will be cost increasing. While the greater costs associated with increased use of primary care may come with improvements in health, a hypothesis in need of more credible evidence, costs will increase nevertheless. Claims that costs will decrease do not appear to be well founded. ** = statistically significant at 1% level; * = statistically significant at 5% level Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on firm * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
